What’s striking to me is that amidst all of these rumblings from the masters of grand strategy is one constant cliché, repeated over and over again—for example, by Dan Drezner, who, like the rest of them, doesn’t always get it wrong. As Drezner puts it, “Europe has thrived under the security umbrella of the United States,” and, again, “If Europe still needs the United States to provide its hard security …”.
Excuse me, but where is the threat? Is Russia going to invade Poland, much less Germany? Is China going to send its “hordes” sweeping across the steppes? Is India? Is Iran going to lay claim to the Hellespont?
No one is going to invade Europe. No one is going to threaten Europe. Britain and France, separately, have a sufficient military to deter any possible invader, or “threatener,” if in fact one should exist. The fact that the performance of the European military forces in Libya was unimpressive is unimportant. Offense is far more demanding than defense, and in any event this was a “special” war, one in which minimal casualties, on both sides, was the first priority. In a real war, blood would be shed with far less circumspection.
Drezner comes quite close realizing this fact in the following paragraph:
Second, overlooking economic power caused neoconservatives to erroneously obsess on the potential military threats and not notice the rising economic power of the advanced developing countries. In recent years American hawks have gotten more desperate on this front, flailing around to find some constellation of threats that justify elevated levels of defense spending. The obsession with military threats is doubly problematic. It calls for a level of military spending that is neither sustainable nor desirable in an era of scarce government revenue; indeed, such expenditures could debilitate America’s economy further. Such a focus also misses a key point: China’s real influence comes from its rising consumer power. In the short to medium term, the primacy of the transatlantic partnership does not face an existential threat from China’s military modernization. The game-changer for the West comes if China’s burgeoning consumer market encourages bandwagoning rather than hedging or balancing by its trading partners.
Afterwords
Grand strategist that he is, Drezner can’t quite let go of the outmoded clichés of past “grand strategy.” “In the short to medium term, the primacy of the transatlantic partnership does not face an existential threat from China’s military modernization.” If Dan would just look at a map, he’d notice that China is not in Europe. If he’d look at China, he’d notice that the Chinese elite maintains itself by promising, and delivering, previously unimaginable material wealth to China’s people. The Soviet elite maintained itself by demanding absolute obedience from the USSR’s poverty-stricken masses in the name of the “Revolution.” There’s a big difference.
Update
I guess my headline should be “the umbrella that isn’t needed.” My metaphors often wobble in the morning.
